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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the reaction of investors to the arrival of 
unexpected information on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The empirical results 
suggest that the investor reaction following unexpected news on the ISE100 is 
consistent with Overreaction Hypothesis especially after unfavorable market 
surprises. Interestingly such pattern does not exist for ISE30 index which includes 
more liquid and informationally efficient securities. 
 
A possible implication of this study for investors is that employing a semi contrarian 
investment strategy of buying losers in ISE100 may generate superior returns. 
Moreover, results are supportive of the last regulation change of Capital Market 
Board of Turkey which mandates more disclosure regarding the trading of less 
liquid stocks with lower market capitalization. 
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ÖZET: Bu çalışma İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsasına sürpriz bir bilgi gelişi 
karşısında yatırımcının tepkisini incelemektedir. IMKB100 endeksi için sonuçlar 
sürpriz bilgi gelişi karşısında yatırımcının davranışının Aşırı Tepki Hipotezi’ne 
uygun olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu durum özellikle negatif etkisi olan bilgi gelişi 
sonrası daha belirgindir. Daha likit ve pazar etkinliği fazla olan şirketler grubunu 
kapsayan IMKB30 endeksi aynı yapıyı göstermemektedir.  
 
Çalışmanın bir sonucu; endeksteki aşırı düşmeler sonrası IMKB100 endeksine 
yatırım yapmanın anormal getiri sağlayabileceğidir. Sonuçlar Sermaye Piyasası 
Kurulu’nun likiditesi ve toplam piyasa değeri düşük olan hisselerin alım satımı için 
daha fazla bilgi verilmesini zorunlu kılan son değişikliklerini destekler niteliktedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası; Pazar Etkinliği; Aşırı 
Tepki; Belirsizlik Hipotezi; Belirsizlik; Anormal Getiri 
 
1. Introduction 
In the past three decades the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has been the most 
venerable tenet of financial economics and a staple of academic analysis. The EMH 
suggests that security prices reflect all currently available information. (historical, 
current and insider information) and securities are efficiently priced at their true 
values. The crucial assumption of EMH is that investors are rational and therefore 
information is reflected to the security values unambiguously. If the EMH holds, 
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then it “rules out the possibility of trading systems based only on currently available 
information that have expected profits or returns in excess of equilibrium expected 
profit or return (Fama 1970). 
 
In recent years, however, the validity of the EMH has been challenged by behavioral 
financial economists arguing that the market participants include not only rational 
economic agents but also “behavioral economic agents,” so-called “noise traders,” 
(Kyle 1985, Black 1986). These agent’s asset allocation and trading decisions are 
often driven by irrational and sentimental considerations (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 
1990 and 1991). Hence, people deviate from the standard decision making model in 
a number of fundamental areas (Kahneman and Riepe 1998). In addition, some 
studies claim that increasing presence of these noise traders relative to institutional 
traders, and the concomitant risks introduced by these unsophisticated traders, result 
in return anomalies (Kamara, 1997; Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991; and Shleifer, 
2000). In this framework, noise traders systematically form expectations based on 
erroneous interpretations of economic events thereby generating systematic risk, or 
noise trader risk, which is incorporated into equilibrium security prices.  
 
Furthermore, theoretical models have been proposed in which the presence of noise 
traders induces rational investors to pursue unexpected favorable feedback 
strategies, which destabilizes security prices (De Long et al., 1990). These 
considerations imply that the interaction of multiple classes of investors with 
heterogeneous beliefs about expected returns for assets result in less-than-optimal 
equilibrium prices. As a result of this interaction, the arbitrage based theoretical case 
for the efficient markets is limited as well. 
 
In recognition of the presence of both “rational economic agents” and “behavioral 
economic agents” in securities markets, three alternative hypotheses have been 
proposed in the finance literature. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) advance the 
“overreaction hypothesis” (OH) to explain the potential sentimental behavior of 
market participants and their subsequent deviation from rationality by being overly 
optimistic or pessimistic in response to the arrival of new information. They argue 
that investors overreact to unexpected information by setting security prices too high 
in reaction to good news, and too low in reaction to bad news. Larson and Madura 
(2001) for the foreign exchange market and Poteshman (2001) for the options 
market document a similar pattern. The second competing explanation, the 
“uncertain information hypothesis” (UIH) set forth by Brown, Harlow and Tinic 
(1988), postulates that investors are not necessarily irrational, but they respond to 
increased uncertainty caused by unexpected arrival of new information. They, 
therefore, could initially set security prices below their fundamental values. 
Subsequent clarifications of the uncertainty result in price reversion to equilibrium 
levels over time. It is speculated that he prediction of the UIH is consistent with 
rational investors’ reaction to “noise-trader risk,” which is priced in equilibrium as 
an additional risk factor. Securities exposed to such a risk will consequently be 
underpriced following the arrival of good or bad news. Zhang (2006) models the 
price movement against uncertainty in information and suggests it as an alternative 
to what is argued as underreaction. He states that greater information uncertainty 
should produce relatively higher expected returns following good news and 
relatively lower expected returns following bad news. The third competing 
explanation, the “underreaction hypothesis” (UH), predicts that security prices will 
move in the same direction of the initial change as the information is slowly 
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incorporated into prices initial prices are revised. The literature presents vast amount 
of evidence in support of underreaction hypothesis.1 Hong and Stein (1999) suggest 
a unified theory of overreaction, underreaction and momentum trading. 
 
Appendix 1 provides a graphical illustration of the stock market reaction to 
unexpected information under the four competing hypotheses outlined above. Panel 
A displays instantaneous price adjustments to the unexpected arrival of favorable or 
unfavorable news as proposed by the EMH. Panel B shows a pattern of price 
reversals following an initial overreaction to good or bad news as posited by the OH. 
Panel C displays price adjustments consistent with the predictions of the UIH, 
whereby price adjustments are positive, or at least non-negative, following the 
arrival of unexpected information. Panel D displays price adjustments consistent 
with the prediction of UH, where initial price adjustments are followed by revisions 
in the same direction. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine investor reaction to surprises on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE hereafter). We examine daily returns of the ISE100 
and ISE30 stock indices. ISE100 include those 30 companies that form the ISE30 
index. ISE30 companies are likely to be the companies that have the most analysts’ 
coverage. Valuation of stocks with fewer analysts’ coverage and less available 
information is more likely to be affected by overreaction, underreaction or 
momentum etc. (Hong etal 2000). However, Tetlock (2010) argues that public news 
coverage helps the diffusion of more information to the price of the security 
reducing the informational asymmetry. Fang and Peress (2009) suggest that mass 
media coverage helps to alleviate the informational frictions helping to overcome 
asymmetric information. Thus, ISE30 index should not reveal significant and 
persistent deviations from fundamental values for long periods whereas evidence for 
the deviations due to behavioral reasons would be more explicit for ISE100 index. 
We examined the daily returns and identified 42 major unexpected events in ISE100 
and 23 major unexpected events in ISE30 (identified using a strictly quantitative 
trigger-point approach) to investigate whether investors’ reactions are consistent 
with the predictions of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), the overreaction 
hypothesis (OU), the underreaction hypothesis (UH) or the uncertain information 
hypothesis (UIH). 
 
Empirical results from this study indicate a significant increase in the volatility of 
daily returns following the arrival of unexpected news in both markets during the 
sample period. Furthermore, the findings suggest that increases in volatility of 
returns following major unfavorable market surprises is associated with increases in 
returns and favorable market surprises is associated with decreases in the ISE100 
index returns, a result consistent with the prediction of the overreaction hypothesis 
(OH). Nevertheless, reversals of stock prices are not at same degree for good or bad 
surprises and stronger following the losses. This to some extent could be explained 
by the “Prospect Theory” suggesting that losses have more emotional impact than an 
equivalent amount of gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). No such pattern is 
examined in ISE30 index supporting the idea that intense coverage of these 
securities helps overcoming information asymmetry. 
Therefore, we believe that the empirical evidence presented here supports the notion 
                                                 
1 Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 
(1995), Michaely, Womack, and Thaler (1995), and Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) 
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that the presence of “noise trader risk” in the stock market leads rational investors to 
respond to new information by initially setting security prices above their 
fundamental their fundamental values. Further clarifications of the deviation result 
in a reverse adjustments of security prices to their fundamental values. 
 
The rest of the paper is set forth as follows. Section II presents the data and 
methodology. The empirical results are presented in Section III and Section IV 
provides the summary and concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1. Data  
The data for this study consist of daily closing values for Istanbul Stock Exchange 
Index adjusted for dividends and stock splits. ISE100 index covers the period of 
January 5th 1988 to April 21st 2010 and ISE30 index covers the period of January 2nd 
1997 to April 21st 2010. 
 
2.2. Methodology  
Daily changes for ISE100 and ISE30 indices are calculated as follows: 
 
 
1
log( )*100tt
t
IR
I 
  (1) 
 
Where, Rt is the daily percentage changes of stock index or exchange rate on day t, 
and It, It-1 are the closing values of stock index or exchange rate on the days t and t-1 
respectively. Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests (not reported here) are 
performed for daily changes in each index, and those tests reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root at the 1% level of significance. Therefore, daily stock market returns 
calculated in Equation (1) are stationary. Summary statistics of daily changes for the 
stock index are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Daily Changes in the Indexes 
INDEX DAYS MEAN MEDIAN STD DEV. MAX MIN 
ISE100* 5540 0.204% 0.133% 2.86% 19.45% -18.11% 
ISE30** 3291 0.174% 0.093% 2.96% 19.30% -18.18% 
* Sample period is from 05/01/1988 to 21/04/2010 
** Sample period is from 02/01/1997 to 21/04/2010 
 
2.3. Measuring Post-Event Variance 
To identify market surprises we use a strictly quantitative “trigger-point” approach.2 
Specifically, we estimated GARCH (p,q) models up to three lags and chose the 
appropriate model based on Akaike and Schwartz criterion. Results favored 
GARCH (2,3) models for daily returns in both of the stock indices and include the 
appropriate number of autoregressive lags necessary in each equation to eliminate 
any serial correlation in the residuals. From GARCH (2,3) models for the stock 
returns, we calculate standardized residuals (which can be interpreted as standard 
deviation units), and use standardized residuals that are different from the mean 
                                                 
2 This approach identifies market-wide unexpected major events and does not attempt to identify any 
company-specific, news-specific or event-specific surprises. 
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standardized residuals at 1% (2.576 standard deviations) significance level to 
determine major event days for both series. That is, we identify the greatest positive 
and negative outliers in the standardized residuals for the market index of 5539 daily 
returns for ISE100 and 3291 daily returns for ISE30 during the sample period.3 
 
Table 2. Trigger Points Used to Determine the Events for Each Market 
Market 
Value of Standardized Residuals 
Good News Bad News 
ISE100 7.31% 7.31% 
No of days 22 20 
ISE30 7.62% 7.62% 
No of days 13 10 
 
In the process, we identified 22 major unexpected favorable events (or good news), 
and 20 major unexpected unfavorable events (or bad news) for ISE100 and 13 major 
unexpected favorable events (or good news), and 10 major unexpected unfavorable 
events (or bad news) for ISE30. We then track returns during a window of 30 days 
after each event, resulting in 1260 post-event daily returns for ISE100 stock index 
and 690 post-event days for the ISE30 stock index. Table 2 displays the positive and 
negative trigger points used to determine favorable and unfavorable event days for 
the two indices, along with the number of events (good and bad) for each. 
 
We next investigate whether the arrival of news (favorable or unfavorable) affects 
the volatility of stock market returns and changes in exchange rates. To do this the 
variance of all 30-day post-event window periods (for all favorable and unfavorable 
events) and the variance of non-event days (entire sample period excluding the post-
event days) are compared to ascertain whether the volatility of “post-event” days 
and “non-event” days are equal using a difference-of-variance test. We also conduct 
a series of difference-of-variance tests to determine whether there is any significant 
difference between a) post-favorable event volatility and non-event volatility, b) 
post-unfavorable event volatility and non-event volatility and c) post-favorable 
event volatility versus post-unfavorable event volatility.  
 
2.4. The Effect of Surprises on Stock Returns 
In order to investigate whether investor’s response to unexpected surprises are 
consistent with the predictions of the EMH, OH, UH or UIH we follow a procedure 
outlined in Brown et al. (1988) and Ajayi and Mehdian (1994). More specifically, 
we calculate daily post-event abnormal returns for both series and average them 
cross-sectionally for each day over the 30-day period following each set of favorable 
or unfavorable events in each series. Finally these 30-day abnormal returns are 
added together to generate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each class 
(favorable and unfavorable) of event. Stated formally, the abnormal return for series 
i on day t (ARitd) for t = 1 to 30, following an unexpected event d, is computed as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
3 To account for the potential leverage effect of negative returns on stock market volatility, we also 
estimated asymmetric GARCH models for each index.  The results indicate that the structure and number 
of outliers is not sensitive to the underlying GARCH model employed. 
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 noniitditd RRAR ,  (2) 
 
where d = 1,…,n and n is the number of favorable or unfavorable events in index i. 
 
Ritd   =   Return of series i on day t for event d,  
noniR ,   =   Mean return of series i for non-event days 
 
The ARitd therefore measures the difference between changes in each series on each 
of the 30 days following an event and the mean change in the series n-event days. 
We then calculate the mean abnormal return itAR  for index i on day t as follows: 
 
 
  30.....1,/1
1


 

tARnAR
n
d
itdit  (3) 
 
Under the null hypothesis, the abnormal returns will be jointly normally distributed 
with a zero conditional mean and conditional variance )(2 itAR :  
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where L is the estimation period length (i.e. number of days used for estimation) and 
mR is the mean of the market portfolio. With L large enough, 
22 )( ieitAR    thus 
variance of non event days 2
ie
  could be used for further tests. 
 
Finally, the CARs are generated by summing up the mean abnormal returns over 30 
days as: 
 
   ittiit ARCARCAR  1 , = 
1
n
it
t
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
  t= 1…30 (5) 
 
We perform a standard t-test as to whether the calculated CARs are statistically 
different from zero. The t-statistic is stated as: 
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where  2iTVar CAR  = 212212 )1(),( iei TTTT    and 1T  = 0 in our specific case. 
 
According to MacKinlay (1997) an aggregation of results for each index can also be 
performed across both time and events. In that scenario, the cumulative average 
abnormal return for each index is defined as:  
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where d is the number of events.  
 
The variance of CAAR  is given by: 
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Under the null hypotheses that the abnormal returns are zero.  
 
To assess the statistical significance of the CARs, we perform t-tests of the null 
hypothesis that the CARs are equal to zero during post-event windows. In addition, 
graphical representations of CARs over the 30 day window for each class of event in 
each series are used to determine whether investors’ behavior is consistent with 
EMH, OH, UH, or UIH.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
Table 3 displays daily mean returns for non-event days, all post-event days, post-
favorable event days, and post-unfavorable event days, along with the sample size 
for each series. As can be seen, the results show that a) aggregate post-event mean 
returns are higher than non-event mean returns for ISE100, lower for ISE30; b) 
mean returns for unfavorable post-event days are higher than mean returns for 
favorable post-event days for both series. 
 
Table 3. Mean Returns for Non-Event Days and Post-Event Days 
Market Non-Event Days 
All Post Event 
Days 
Post Favorable 
Event Days 
Post Unfavorable 
Event Days 
ISE100 0.164% 0.248% 0.074% 0.438% 
No of days 4138 1260 660 600 
     
ISE30 0.171% 0.071% 0.012% 0.086% 
No of days 2432 667 377 290 
 
Table 4 presents the variance of daily returns for non-event days, all post-event 
days, favorable post-event days and unfavorable post-event days, along with the 
sample size for each series. 
 
This table contains two columns of F-statistics. In the penultimate column, the first 
F-statistic reported for each market is the test-statistic of the null-hypothesis that the 
variance of post-event returns is equal to the variance of all non-event returns. The 
second F-statistic is for the test of the null-hypotheses that the variance of returns 
following favorable events is equal to the variance of returns during non-event days, 
and the third F-statistic is for the test of the null-hypotheses that the variance of 
returns in the period following unfavorable events is equal to the variance of returns 
during non-event days. The second column contains the F-statistics testing the null-
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hypothesis that the variance of returns following favorable events is equal to the 
variance of returns following unfavorable events. 
 
Table 4. Variance of Returns for Non-Event Days and Post-Event Days 
Market Sample Days Variance(%) F-statistic(a) F-statistic(b) 
1. ISE100     
Non-event Days 4137 5.575 --- --- 
Post-event Days 1260 6.895 0.809***  
Favorable 660 7.087 0.787*** 1.071 
Unfavorable 600 6.625 0.841***  
2. ISE30     
Non-event Days 2432 7.834 --- --- 
Post-event Days 667 5.143 1.523***  
Favorable 377 5.090 1.539*** 0.934 
Unfavorable 290 5.448 1.438***  
a) The first F-statistic (a) for each stock index is the test statistic of the null hypothesis that the variance 
of post-event returns is equal to the variance of non-event returns.  The second F-statistic (a) is the 
test statistic of the null hypothesis that the variance of returns after unexpected favorable events is 
equal to the variance of non-event returns. The third F-statistic (a) is from a test of the null hypothesis 
that the variance of returns after unexpected unfavorable events is equal to the variance of non-event 
returns. 
b) F-statistic (b) is the test statistic of the null hypothesis that the variance of returns after unexpected 
favorable events is equal to the variance of returns after unexpected unfavorable events. 
Note: Post-event periods contain the days after both favorable and unfavorable events.***, ** and * 
indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
It can be seen that the F-statistics indicate that the variance of returns following both 
unfavorable and favorable market surprises (good or bad) is statistically significantly 
higher than the variance of returns for non-event days for ISE100. These results 
provide support for the notion that the volatility of ISE100 index returns increases 
significantly following unexpected events. We observe the opposite relation for 
ISE30. This result and the descriptive statistics suggest that behavioral agents affect 
the return of ISE100 whereas ISE30 display a structure that supports the efficient 
market hypothesis.  
 
The last column of F-statistics in Table 4 indicates that post-event market volatility 
is not statistically significantly different following favorable or unfavorable events 
Thus, the difference between post event days volatility and no event days volatility 
is not specific to the type of the event. 
 
Table 5 displays post-event cumulative average abnormal returns (CARRs) along 
with their corresponding t-values for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, and 30 days following 
surprises, while Figure 1 presents the graphs of the CARRs over the 30-day post-
event windows for each index. The t-values are calculated using Equation (9) to test 
the null hypothesis that the CARRs are equal to zero.  
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Table 5. Post-Event Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
Market Post-Event Day 
Favorable 
Event CARR t-statistics 
Unfavorable 
Event CARR t-statistics 
1. ISE100 
+1 day -0.483 -0.67 0.808 1.08 
+2 -0.426 -0.49 1.576 1.72* 
+3 0.246 0.24 1.939 1.84* 
+4 1.261 1.12 2.762 2.34** 
+5 1.080 0.88 3.789 2.93*** 
+10 0.222 0.13 5.299 3.03*** 
+20 -1.143 -0.50 7.549 3.12*** 
+30 -2.682 0.96 8.226 2.80*** 
2. ISE30 
+1 day 0.270 0.25 1.200 0.96 
+2 0.880 0.65 -0.530 0.35 
+3 -0.042 -0.03 -0.611 0.35 
+4 -0.736 -0.42 -0.586 0.30 
+5 -1.820 -0.96 -0.338 -0.16 
+10 -0.574 -0.22 -1.039 -0.35 
+20 -2.908 -0.82 -0.749 -0.19 
+30 -4.612 -1.07 -2.464 -0.50 
 
ISE30 reveals a supportive pattern of the argument of press coverage and related 
liquidity. As outlined above, the test results of ISE30 are not only important to us 
alone but also shed light on the interpretation of further results on ISE100. Both the 
pattern and the insignificance of the statistical results of the CARRs of the ISE30 
following an “unexpected negative surprise” suggests that investors could not beat 
the market by taking a specific position in this index. The pattern of the positive 
unexpected surprises for ISE30 resembles the pattern of same type of events for 
ISE100. However, the CARRs are not statistically different than zero, neither. 
Overall, insignificant post surprise results support EMH suggesting that ISE30 index 
which includes securities that are a widely covered in press, highly liquid and traded 
in large aggregate volumes displays an efficient trading environment.  
 
However, same analysis of ISE100 index which includes (besides the ISE30 stocks) 
additional 70 securities which are relatively less liquid shares with less information 
flow reveal different results. It is striking to note that the CARRs in Table 5 and the 
graphs in Figure 1 exhibit a set of identifiable patterns. The CARRs of ISE100 index 
exhibit largely statistically significant increases during the 30 day period following 
the arrival of an unfavorable market surprise. The corresponding CARRs for the 
favorable events exhibit an opposite pattern of decreases though not statistically 
significant. The pattern exhibited by the ISE 100 is consistent with the notion that 
the arrival of unexpected negative information generates market-wide uncertainty, 
inducing a pessimistic reaction on the part of investors, so that they initially set 
security prices below their fundamental values. However, further clarification of the 
uncertainty results in positive price adjustment to their fundamental values as 
predicted by the Overreaction Hypothesis (OH). Pattern of the ISE100 return 
following unexpected positive information also supports the OH but the CARRs are 
not statistically different from zero, preventing us from reaching a conclusive result. 
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Figure1a.  Post-Event Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of ISE100 
 
 
Figure1b.  Post-Event Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of ISE30 
 
Results overall suggest that as we move from a basket of securities (ISE30) to 
another basket of securities relatively less liquidity and with less press coverage 
results reveal evidence of the violation of EMH. These patterns certainly allow 
investors to obtain abnormal returns. In ISE100 case, results suggest that investors 
could achieve significant abnormal returns by buying current losers. 
 
Finally these results raise the question whether a similar pattern exists at individual 
security base. Tetlock (2010) provides evidence that is inconsistent with the idea of 
all inefficiencies being result of behavioral reasons. Therefore the subject deserves 
further examination. However, evidence of the appearance of such behavioral 
patterns is interesting, considering the recent regulation change enforced by The 
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Capital Market Board of Turkey dividing the securities in three groups based on 
market capitalization in order to overcome manipulation.  
 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper examines investor’s reaction in the Istanbul Stock Exchange Indices, 
ISE100 and ISE30 following the arrival of unexpected information during the period 
from 1988 to 2010. Market surprises are identified for both indices using a strictly 
quantitative “trigger-point” approach, and cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated and traced for a period of 30 days following each favorable and 
unfavorable event. 
 
The empirical results indicate a significant increase in the volatility of daily changes 
in both indices following the arrival of unexpected news. Nevertheless ISE30 pattern 
is consistent with EMH. We believe that it is due to the reason that the securities 
included in ISE30 are highly liquid, well traded and well covered in press.  
 
In addition, patterns of cumulative abnormal returns indicate changes in ISE100 
following good or bad events is consistent with the Overreaction Hypothesis. Yet, 
significant only on the bad news side, implying that, losses have more impact than an 
equivalent amount of gains as suggested by “Prospect Theory”. Our findings are 
consistent with the notion that the presence of “noise trader risk” in stock market leads 
rational investors to respond to new unfavorable information by initially setting 
security prices below their fundamental values. Further clarifications of the uncertainty 
result in positive changes as security prices move to their fundamental values.  
 
A possible implication of this study for investors is that implementing a strategy of 
purchasing ISE100 Index Fund following a bad news may generate abnormal results. 
 
Finally further research is needed on individual stocks as to investigate whether such 
patterns are more visible for stocks with less market capitalization (i.e. relatively 
small company shares). 
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Appendix 1a. Market Reaction to Unexpected Good and Bad News According 
to Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
PA = price before the news        
PB = price after the news 
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Appendix 1b. Market Reaction to Unexpected Good and Bad News According 
to Overreaction Hypothesis 
 
 
Appendix 1c. Market Reaction to Unexpected Good and Bad News According 
to Uncertain Information Hypothesis 
 
 
Appendix 1d. Market Reaction to Unexpected Good and Bad News According 
to Underreaction Hypothesis 
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